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1. Introduction 
In International Relations theory and research only few concepts and activities deal explic-
itly with the South in global governance. Most works focus on governance and policy mak-
ing by and in developed countries of the North or the so-called OECD world (for a similar 
critique see: Thomas/Wilkin 2004; Conzelmann/Faust 2005). Only in the aftermath of the ter-
rorist attacks on 9/11 both in real politics and in political science the situation in developing 
countries and their relations to global politics attracted more attention. 
Besides the bias towards research on Northern topics due to the fact that most of the influen-
tial research institutes and universities are based in industrialised countries, there are at 
least two more reasons for the deficits in research on the role of Southern actors. First, the 
terms ‘South’, ‘Third World’ and ‘developing countries’ were put into question in the 1990s 
for several good reasons. It was argued that economic, political and social processes had led 
to a rapidly increasing differentiation among the developing countries, so that one generalis-
ing term would be too imprecise, and that poorer countries do not build a homogenous po-
litical bloc or coalition (cf. Menzel 1992; Nohlen/Nuscheler 1992; Hein 1998; Ashcroft 1999; 
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Thomas/Wilkin 2004). Second, structural changes in international politics made it more and 
more inappropriate to deal only with governments, states and International Organisations 
as political actors and fora in the international – or better: global – realm. Non-state actors 
such as CSOs, transnational corporations (TNCs) and foundations as well as hybrid govern-
ance forms (e.g. public-private partnerships) played a more and more important role (cf. 
Rosenau 1997; Held/McGrew 2002, Wilkinson 2005; Koenig-Archibugi/Zürn 2006). Thus, 
many researchers focused more on these so-called new types of actors and organisations and 
less on questions how Southern actors are affected by and integrated in this new governance 
architecture. 
In this paper1, we argue that it is necessary to open the governance discourse more towards 
the Non-OECD world and to take into account the relevance of the governance structures 
which influence the participation of Southern actors, the power relations which are shaping 
the constellation of actors, and the processes of interaction that are relevant for framing pol-
icy ideas, discourses and activities in the global realm. We agree with the argument that ‘the 
South’ is not a homogenous group of countries or even a kind of collective actor, but think it 
is still reasonable to use that category for sociological and political science analyses if it is 
based on common socio-economic characteristics and on similar experiences such as a pe-
ripheral position in the global economy, widespread poverty, human insecurity and a great 
vulnerability to external processes and forces (cf. Conzelmann/Faust 2005). This socio-
economic fragile and peripheral position is intertwined with a peripheral role in global gov-
ernance or ‘with a lack of say in global affairs’ as Thomas/Wilkin (2004: 243) put it. 
Besides the differentiation between different socio-economic levels (such as e.g. high in-
come, upper middle-income, lower middle income and low income countries) and between 
different geographic areas, it is important to distinguish between different types of actors in 
the countries of the South. An analysis of global governance can not just focus on govern-
ments, but has to include non-state actors such as CSOs and enterprises as actors of the 
South. This relates to the fact that there are manifold conflicts both inside the South and in-
side each country of the South between e.g. governments and CSOs, between national elites 
and marginalized groups, or between different classes. 
We argue that the polity and politics of global governance become crucial if we want to cap-
ture how state and non-state actors from the South influence policies and discourses and 
                                                     
1  The paper presents some of the findings of the research project ‘Global Health Governance ’ at the 
GIGA German Institute of Global and Area Studies; see www.giga-hamburg.de/ghg/. As our re-
search is characterised by collective work, this paper includes work and thoughts of the colleagues 
involved in the research team, in particular of Wolfgang Hein. Some parts of this paper were pre-
sented at the International Studies Association Annual Meeting 2006, San Diego, March 21-25, 
2006 and at the ECPR Joint Sessions of Workshops, Nicosia, April 25-30, 2006. 
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how they are affected by them. To analyse more systematically these interactions we intro-
duce the concept of interfaces - socio-political spaces of recurrent interaction of actors in the 
handling of specific problems - and differentiate between organisational, discoursive, legal 
and resource-transfer interfaces in global governance. We argue that such an approach al-
lows us to capture more in detail the various channels of influence of Southern actors in 
global governance than conventional approaches that largely neglect the Non-OECD world. 
In this paper, we will show that despite the dominance of actors from Northern countries in 
particular areas of global governance basically weak actors like civil society organisations 
(CSOs) and governments from the South have the chance to influence strategies and policies 
due to the institutional setting of global governance. 
We will focus our empirical analysis of the role of Southern actors in global processes of 
governance on the policy field of global health. This policy field seems appropriate for our 
analysis for several reasons: First, essential parts of global health governance – such as the 
fight against poverty-related infectious diseases (HIV/AIDS, Tuberculosis, Malaria) and the 
efforts to strengthen health systems at national level – aim at changing the situation in de-
veloping countries, so Southern actors are of crucial importance for any kind of goal-
attainment. Second, as there is a significant interdependency between poverty and health, 
increasing parts of official development assistance (ODA) are spent on health issues and 
three of the eight Millennium Development Goals are explicitly health-related, what shows 
that health is accepted as an important component for development and poverty-reduction 
in the Southern hemisphere (cf. Bartsch/Kohlmorgen 2005b). Third, governance processes in 
global health are characterised by a strong role of non-state actors (e.g. pharmaceutical com-
panies, insurance companies, private physicians and pharmacists, foundations, a large 
number of CSOs and PPPs) so that this policy field seems well suited to analyse the correla-
tion between so-called new governance modes and participation of Southern actors. 
In the following we will first outline our global governance approach, focussing on power 
relations and interfaces between different actors (section 2). Before applying this concept to 
the empirical study, in section 3 we will briefly sketch the institutional structure of global 
health governance. In section 4 we will then analyse the role of both state and non-state ac-
tors from the South in a specific area of global health: the fight against HIV/AIDS and the ac-
cess to medicines. We examine Southern participation in the most relevant International Or-
ganisations in health, analyse the role of Southern actors in the discourses on patents, intel-
lectual property rights and access to medicines, and deal with the various financing mecha-
nisms in the field of global health. In the concluding remarks (section 5), the most important 
lessons for Southern participation in processes of global governance drawn from the empiri-
cal study of the global health sector will be summarized. 
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2. Global Governance: Conceptual Considerations 
Our concept of global governance is not a normative one, saying how global governance 
should be, but an empirical-analytical one, which tries to describe and to understand the ori-
gins, the complex characteristics and the dynamics of global politics and regulations. In our 
understanding, global governance comprises non-hierarchical forms of regulation and coop-
eration, but also power structures and hierarchical top-down processes. It is selective as far 
as the problems and issues dealt with are concerned, and also with respect to the inclusion 
and influence of weaker actors – such as many Southern governments or CSOs. 
Political globalisation is not only a process leading to the development of a new spatial or-
der which causes increasing political activities between different levels (global, regional, na-
tional, local; cf. Rosenau 1997; Jessop 2004; Hooghe/Marks 2004), but also an expression of a 
new configuration of actors. Governance is the interplay of different institutional forms 
ranging from public to private modes of regulation (with specific logics of steering and ac-
tion) and comprises the interaction of different actors (with specific power resources and in-
terests). Governance includes regulation by state (nation states, intergovernmental organisa-
tions), private regulation (private sector), civil society regulation and hybrid regulation (coopera-
tion by states/international organisations, private sector and/or civil society). As there is not 
only an increase of intergovernmental and international activities, but also a significant raise 
of transnational activities (i.e. transborder activities of civil society and private sector) we 
can speak of global instead of international governance. Modifying a definition by Renate 
Mayntz (2005) we define global governance as the totality of collective regulations to deal 
with international and transnational interdependence problems (cf. Bartsch/Kohlmorgen 
2005a). 
Global governance thus can be understood as a process of dealing with problems and – if 
possible – of problem-solving. However, the acknowledgement of problems and the will-
ingness to tackle them are not self-evident. Problems need to be identified and put on the 
agenda, and the related discourses have to be framed. This agenda-setting and framing 
process is a result of the interactions between the different actors and is influenced by the 
power relations of global governance. Often problems are only tackled if powerful actors 
have interests in solving them. Moreover, when a problem is acknowledged we have to ask 
if appropriate structures of governance are in place and which strategies prevail to solve – or 
shift, or neglect – the problem. The institutional setting in which problems can be addressed 
does not exist just because of a functional imperative, but is the result of historical traditions 
and structures as well as deliberate decisions of involved actors based on interests, power 
and resources (cf. Mayntz 2005). Thus, if we want to capture who influences global policy-
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making we can not just focus on the effectiveness of problem-solving, but have to analyse 
the interactions in global governance in the light of the different types of power and inter-
ests that are associated with the actors. 
The normative problem-solving bias of some parts of the global governance literature often 
leads to the implicit assumption that most of the actors have common or similar goals and 
interests. In particular if we want to understand the role of Southern actors in global gov-
ernance, however, it is relevant to address the differences and the conflicting characters of 
interests of the actors involved. Also power relations seem to be forgotten in many global 
governance approaches and studies (see the critique in Brand et al. 2000). While power al-
ways was a central component in (neo-)realistic and (neo-)marxist approaches, it was for a 
long time largely neglected in the global governance discourse, rooted in liberal institution-
alism. Recently the debate was opened again by Barnett/Duvall (2005), who introduce mul-
tiple forms of power and stress that power relations influence not only the activities of the 
participating actors but also the effectiveness and legitimacy of the entire global governance 
architecture. We refer to their work and that of Bas Arts (2003) and propose to differentiate 
between different types of power of which actors dispose (cf. Barnett/Duvall 2005; Arts 
2003). These types of power derive from the structures of the governance system and the 
function of each actor in this system. Thus we can differentiate between: discoursive power 
(the ability to frame and influence discourses); decision-making power (the ability to be in-
volved in decision making and in formal norm setting); legal power (the ability to exert power 
based on legal structures and laws) and resource-based power (refers to the actors’ disposal 
over material resources (e.g. money, staff) and immaterial resources (e.g. knowledge, infor-
mation) and their ability to provide these resources). 
These different types of power, of course, are not always equally important. This becomes 
clear when we look at the various spaces of interaction in global governance. We can ob-
serve that the influence of the different actors varies, depending on whether they interact 
with each other e.g. in a legal conflict, in an official decision-making body of an International 
Organization, in the implementation of a bilateral programme, or in discussions/discourses 
on specific issues. Referring to Norman Long’s (2001) concept of social interface, which he 
developed for global-local interactions in development policy, we propose a concept of in-
terfaces in global governance, which serves as a heuristic instrument to structure interac-
tions of the different actors and to distinguish between the various channels of influence 
both for state and non-state actors from the South. 
Long defines social interfaces ‘as a critical point of interaction or linkage between different 
social systems, fields or levels of social order where structural discontinuities based upon 
differences of normative value and social interest, are most likely to be found’ (Long 1989: 1-
10 Bartsch/Kohlmorgen: The Role of Southern Actors in Global Governance 
2). Interfaces are not only two-sided forms of articulation but are more complex as they in-
clude a variety of different interests, relationships and modes of rationality. Although an in-
terface as defined by Long can link actors with common interests, he stresses the dynamic 
and conflictive nature of interfaces arising from different interests, resources and power. 
We modify Long’s approach by concentrating less on cultural practices and sociological as-
pects (though not denying their importance) but focusing stronger on the political processes 
and dynamics in global governance, and thus adapt his definition of interfaces in the follow-
ing way: ’Interfaces in global governance are socio-political spaces of recurrent interactions 
of collective actors in the handling of transnational and international affairs.’ (Bartsch et al. 
2007). To analyse more in detail how global governance is influenced by particular actors, it 
is necessary to specify the types of interface. We propose to distinguish between four types 
of interfaces: 
 Discoursive interfaces, which are related to communications about a basic understand-
ing of and strategies to deal with the issues which arise at interactions between dif-
ferent levels of politics and different types of actors. These might imply program-
matic aspects if longer-ranging concepts of cooperation and problem-solving are de-
veloped. 
 Organizational interfaces appear if sporadic and unconnected activities lead to a conti-
nuity and consolidation or even the foundation of organizations, which typically 
comprise actors from the international and national levels of politics (partnerships, 
participation in organizations and/or decision making bodies, operational coopera-
tion, consolidated programmatic cooperation) 
 Legal interfaces occur if actors aim at influencing legislative processes and negotia-
tions and or the implementation of law at national or international level (legal con-
flicts, international agreements) ). 
 Resource-transfer interfaces play an important role particularly in the context of devel-
opment policy, but, of course, also from rich countries to multilateral organizations 
in various fields of social politics. Transfer of material and immaterial resources oc-
curs between different levels of politics but also between different policy areas and 
types of actors. 
 
We argue that an analysis of interactions along these different interfaces allows us to capture 
in detail the various channels of influence of Southern actors in global governance and thus 
to overcome the conventional approaches to the analysis of global governance which largely 
neglect regional differences in the dimensions of interests and power and often disregard 
the non-OECD world. 
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3. The Policy Field of Global Health 
Several developments – such as the increasing transborder spread of infectious diseases – 
have accelerated the onset of global health governance.2 The increasing activities in the field 
of global health also result from one of the characteristics of political globalisation: Due to 
deficits of global regulation and governance by state actors (nation states and International 
Organisations) there is a certain governance vacuum at the global level in some policy fields, 
which gives non-state actors (in particular civil society organisations) and also other rela-
tively weak actors the chance to exert influence on political decision or even to fulfil some of 
the deficitary state functions. 
This was (and to some extent is) definitely the case in certain phases and fields of global 
health governance, e.g. in the fight against HIV/AIDS. Whereas in the 1990s international 
and transnational activities to reverse and to fight the growing HIV/AIDS epidemic in de-
veloping countries were at a relatively low level, CSOs enhanced their efforts in advocacy 
and influencing global and national policy discourses as well as in supporting prevention 
and providing help for people suffering from AIDS (cf. Bartsch/Kohlmorgen 2007). From 
2000 on, also the World Bank and the World Health Organisation (WHO) – after having 
transferred its competences, personnel and resources in handling HIV/AIDS to the Joint 
United Nations Programme on HIV/AIDS (UNAIDS) in 1996 – started to address more 
wholeheartedly the fight against HIV/AIDS. Besides these public and private forms of regu-
lation another mechanisms of global health governance gained importance since the mid-
1990s: hybrid regulation between state and non-state actors, mostly in the form of global 
public-private partnerships (GPPPs). Today we can find about 80 of such GPPPs in the 
health sector, which aim at supporting the development of new medicines and vaccines, eas-
ing access to existing ones, advocating for the fight against specific diseases, or financing 
health interventions (cf. Widdus 2001; Buse/Walt 2002; Bartsch 2003; Richter 2004; Caines et 
al. 2004). 
The important role of CSOs also accounts for the relative importance of human and social 
rights in global health governance and is one of the driving forces of global health activities. 
For many years CSO have advocated for a better implementation of human rights both in a 
broader context and in the field of global health. The increasing prominence of health and 
the intensifying global health governance, however, can only be partly explained by a 
greater weight of CSOs. Without the commitments and financial contributions of a number 
of Northern governments global health governance would not have accelerated. The inter-
                                                     
2  For concepts and discussion of global health governance: cf. Dodgson et al. (2002); Lee et al.(2002); 
Kickbusch (2003); Hein/Kohlmorgen (2003); Thomas/Weber (2004). 
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ests of these governments are mixed: Of course, Northern governments will not deny hu-
man rights objectives, however, the perception that ill-health in developing countries and 
the transborder spread of infectious diseases like HIV/AIDS, SARS or tuberculosis can be a 
threat to national and international security, can be considered crucial for the onset and dy-
namics of global health governance. 
The institutional structures of global health governance – consisting of a mixture between 
state, civil society, private and hybrid modes of regulation – give non-state actors and actors 
from the South a chance to participate and to influence policies and discourses, especially as 
Northern actors in the beginning only showed little interest in global health. However, with 
the growing awareness of the risks of bad health situations in developing countries, gov-
ernments of industrialised countries have intensified their activities and shaped global 
health governance correspondingly. In fact, the current structures and policies of global 
health governance can be interpreted as a compromise between actors which pursue primar-
ily self-interests based on security concerns and actors which focus on human rights inter-
ests (Hein/Kohlmorgen 2005). 
 
 
4. Southern Actors in Global Health Governance 
The concept of interfaces, as introduced in section 2, will be applied in the following to ana-
lyse the role of Southern actors in global health governance more systematically. It serves as 
heuristic instrument to structure the field of global health and to differentiate between the 
various channels of influence both for state and non-state actors from the South. 
We will first deal with the organisational interfaces (4.1) and give an overview on Southern 
participation in the most relevant International Organisations in health: WHO, World Bank, 
UNAIDS and Global Fund. Then the role of Southern actors in the discourses on the TRIPS 
agreement (4.2) and the conflicts at the legal interfaces (4.3) around the access to medicines 
will be analysed. We argue that Southern influence at these two interface types was rela-
tively high, while it is mixed with regard to the decision-making processes at the organisa-
tional interfaces and limited at best at the resource-transfer interfaces (4.4) that are largely 
dominated by the interests and strategies of bi- and multilateral donors. 
 
4.1. Organisational Interfaces: International Organisations 
The World Health Organisation (WHO) is an intergovernmental organisation which consists 
of governments that are members of the World Health Assembly (WHA, all member states) 
and the Executive Board (32 member states, appointed by the WHA). Formally, all countries 
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have the same influence on WHO’s strategies and policies. Governments of developing 
countries have – compared e.g. with the World Bank – a relatively strong position inside 
WHO, as the WHA functions according to the principle ’one country, one vote’ and deci-
sion-making power is distributed evenly among all members. The developing countries thus 
dispose of a comfortable majority of approximately 2/3 both at the WHA and the Executive 
Board. Since 1966, more than half of the biennial budget is spent for programmes and opera-
tional activities in developing countries (cf. Koivusalo/Ollila 1997: 8). This shows that WHO 
focuses considerable parts of its work on developing countries and that development issues 
and the relationship between poverty and health are of great relevance. However, much of 
these activities in developing countries are financed with extra budgetary funds (2/3 of the 
WHO funding is extra-budgetary and depends on donor countries); this increases the influ-
ence of Northern governments and leads to a shift in the actual power relations. Through 
their resource-based power governments of industrialised countries often informally affect 
decisions and policies of WHO both via the WHA and in particular by exerting influence on 
the secretariat and staff. There is informal impact and pressure by relevant donor countries 
(mainly the U.S.) in decisions concerning top-level staff (such as the Director General and 
also Assistant Directors General) and concerning main policies and programmes (cf. Koi-
vusalo/Ollila 1997; Lee 2004; Murray 2005; Ruger/Yach 2005; Kohlmorgen 2007). 
The World Bank is basically a development bank– of course related to a specific interpreta-
tion of development . As organisational interface it brings together nation states, but their 
decision-making power is not equal, as voting rights are distributed according to the capital 
contribution, which gives economically strong countries greater influence inside the organi-
sation than weaker countries. The Bank is the greatest single donor in health and one of the 
greatest single donors in the fight against HIV/AIDS. One of the first large funding initia-
tives in that field was the Banks’ Multi Country HIV/AIDS Program (MAP) that started in 
2000 and distributed so far approximately US$ 1,1 billion US$ to 34 African countries. The 
World Bank can be considered a powerful actor of global health governance mainly due to 
its resource-based power. But it is not only influential because of its lending and granting ac-
tivities but also because of its discoursive power in affecting political and operational strate-
gies in the health sector (cf. Buse/Gwin 1998; Abasi 1999; Thomas/Weber 2004; Ruger 2005; 
Kohlmorgen 2007). 
UNAIDS, created in 1996 as successor of the Global Programme on AIDS (GPA) of WHO, is 
a new kind of entity in the UN system, uniting ten UN organisations and also including 
non-state actors to some extent. UNAIDS can be seen as an attempt by the UN to react to the 
institutional developments in global health and to improve the effectiveness of the global 
fight against HIV/AIDS. Besides the co-sponsoring UN organisations, delegates of 22 gov-
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ernments from the North and the South and of five CSOs are members of the Programme 
Coordinating Board, the highest body of UNAIDS. Although the CSOs are only non-voting 
members, the participation of non-state actors in a formal decision-making body is a novelty 
for the UN system (apart from the tripartite ILO). UNAIDS’ objectives are to coordinate 
HIV/AIDS related UN activities, to contribute to the coordination and harmonisation of the 
efforts of other actors and to advocate a global reaction against HIV/AIDS (cf. Altman 2001: 
20f.; Söderholm 1997: 125ff.; Kohlmorgen 2004). 
The Global Fund to Fight HIV/AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria (GF) is a global public-private 
partnership to finance the fight against the three major poverty-related diseases. It was es-
tablished in 2002, following an initiative by the G 8 countries and Kofi Annan, The GF is the 
leading financing mechanism in the case of tuberculosis and malaria, where it contributes to 
66% and 45% of all international funding, respectively. In the case of HIV/AIDS the GF 
strongly interacts with other financing institutions like the World Bank or the bilaterals and 
makes up approximately 20% of all international funding. So far it approved 5.2 billion US$ 
to support programmes in 131 countries and received pledges of more then 8.6 billion US$ 
until 2008. Only 3 % of all contributions come from non-state actors, while the G8 countries 
alone finance two thirds of the GF. What makes the GF special among the actors of global 
health is thus not so much its resource base, but its governance structure as public-private 
partnership: The Executive Board consists of five types of constituencies3 which are grouped 
into two voting groups of the same size and one non-voting group.4 The donor group is 
composed of eight representatives of governments of industrialized countries and two rep-
resentatives of the private sector (one company, one foundation). The recipient group con-
sists of seven representatives of governments of developing countries and three representa-
tives of civil society (one North CSO, one South CSO, one CSO of affected communities). 
WHO, World Bank and UNAIDS together with a Swiss member (as the GF is based in Ge-
neva) belong to the non-voting group. A similar structure exists at country level, where 
multi-stakeholder entities – so-called Country Coordinating Mechanisms – have to be estab-
lished in order to apply for GF funding (in a kind of bottom-up approach). Both state and 
non-state actors from the South thus are not only loosely participating in the GF but are pro-
vided with actual decision-making power. They also dispose of a relatively high discoursive 
power in the GF, as they can successfully claim to represent the interests of those groups 
who should be at the centre of the activities of the GF: the people living with the diseases in 
                                                     
3  Donor countries, recipient countries, civil society, private sector, bi- and multilateral agencies.
4  Most Board decisions are made by consensus; if this is not possible, a double majority both in an 
between the voting groups is required. 
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the developing world (cf. Bartsch 2006 + 2007, Radelet 2004, Radelet/Caines 2005, Bezanson 
2005). 
We conclude that the degree of influence of Southern actors at the organisational interfaces 
is closely related to the prevailing governance modes. While the GF as a hybrid form of 
regulation enables both state and non-state actors from the South to formally participate in 
the political processes and also UNAIDS shows some rudimental involvement of CSOs, the 
two other organisations are built on the model of state regulation which largely excludes 
non-state actors. Southern state actors are able to exert influence in these intergovernmental 
organisations to a varying degree, depending on the prevailing norms, rules and proce-
dures. The mode of governance is thus highly relevant as it influences both the degree of in-
clusion/exclusion of certain actors and the power relations at the different organisational in-
terfaces. 
 
4.2. Discoursive Interfaces: Campaign for Access to Medicines 
While the organisational interfaces in global health governance give a mixed picture in 
terms of Southern influence, both state and non-state actors from the developing world play 
an important role at the discoursive interfaces. This could be observed clearly in the context 
of one of the most salient issues in global health governance: the fight against HIV/AIDS and 
the treatment of people suffering from AIDS in the developing world, where human rights 
arguments especially from CSOs and Southern actors had a large influence. 
In the 1990s, prevention was the standard norm in the fight against HIV/AIDS in developing 
countries, and the provision of antiretroviral drugs (ARVs) was restricted to very few AIDS 
victims. At that time, advocates of a prevention-only approach argued that providing ARV 
treatment was not cost-effective in poor regions, as prices for ARVs were too high. This 
changed since the end of the 1990s due to a mixture of processes in which actors from the 
South played an important role. 
First of all treatment became feasible in low-income countries as prices for ARVs declined: 
From 2000 to 2005 the lowest price for a ARV triple combination of branded drugs fell from 
nearly US$ 11,000 to US$ 562 (per person/year), for generics the lowest price was US$ 152 by 
the middle of 2005 (MSF 2005: 10). The price reduction in branded drugs was mainly the re-
sult of the increasing competition by generic companies from India and South Africa, which 
forced the producers to reduce their prices in order to avoid a loss of market shares. Fur-
thermore the TRIPS (Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights) agreement from 
1994 (and the conflicts around it) influenced the prices of ARVs. The TRIPS agreement codi-
fies obligations to all WTO member states regarding copyrights, trademarks, patents etc., 
which includes patents for drugs. It came into being under the strong pressure of transna-
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tional companies that linked the issues of intellectual property rights with the debate on free 
trade and lobbied for a stronger protection of their patented products (cf. Sell/Prakash 2004). 
While all countries are obliged to adapt their patent laws to a level of protection of intellec-
tual property rights established by TRIPS, developing countries were allowed transition pe-
riods during which they would have to integrate the changes into their national legislation. 
Because of the consequences of more rigorous patent laws for the availability of generics, in-
creasing pressure was exerted by CSOs and developing countries governments in WTO ne-
gotiations to clarify the relation of TRIPS to public health concerns. It was argued that the 
TRIPS agreement – after the end of the transition period – would lead to higher prices for 
drugs and consequently impede treatment in poorer countries. 
Since the late 1990s, a large network of CSOs5 have been advocating and campaigning for 
access of poor AIDS victims to ARVs in the Essential Drugs Campaign (cf. Sell 2002; ‘t Hoen 
2002; Schultz/Walker 2005). These CSOs – originally only supported by Brazil –argued that 
intellectual property rights were not only a trade but a also public health issue and thus 
managed to link these two issues. They scandalised the disaccord between high prices and 
profits for pharmaceutical companies on the one hand and the suffering and dying of mil-
lions of AIDS victims on the other hand. They not only lobbied representatives of Interna-
tional Organisations and Northern governments, but also became increasingly important as 
advisors to developing country members of WTO and helped them to coordinate their posi-
tions in the following re-negotiations of the TRIPS agreement. Governments of developing 
countries cooperated with CSOs during the negotiations and CSOs brought in their political, 
legal and technical knowledge and contacts to governments of industrialised countries. 
CSOs during that process thus were changing their character from basically mobilizing and 
advocatory actors towards cooperating experts and actors with a negotiating role in the 
global political process. 
The Doha Declaration, which was adopted at the 4th WTO Ministerial Conference in No-
vember 2001, can be interpreted as the result of these developments. Governments from the 
South in coalition with CSOs reached a compromise with respect to patents on drugs which 
includes at least the possibility for poor countries to produce or import cheap generics in 
case of a public health emergency. It is reaffirmed that the WTO members have the right to 
use compulsory licenses and parallel importing ‘to protect public health’ which gave them a 
certain safety in using the TRIPS flexibilities. Conflicts prevailed on the interests of the 
pharmaceutical industry to restrict new regulations on issuing compulsory licenses for pro-
duction of drugs in a foreign country to a small number of diseases and to demand specific 
                                                     
5  Including Northern based Médecines Sans Frontières, Oxfam International, Consumer Project on 
Technology, the Southern based Third World Network and Health Action International. 
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procedures to make sure that exports to industrial countries could be prevented. Finally in 
September 2003, however, the pharmaceutical industry and the governments from industri-
alised countries had to accept the authorization of compulsory licences in the case of health 
emergencies irrespective of the disease involved (cf. Hein/Kohlmorgen 2005; Hein 2007). 
The reasons for this compromise and for the success of developing countries and CSOs are 
manifold. First, the general agenda of the Doha meeting played a role. The group of South-
ern countries was acting as one bloc and was well prepared to defend its position on drug 
patents. The industrialised countries, on the other hand, were interested in opening up a 
new round of trade negotiations and thus aimed at preventing severe conflicts with impor-
tant developing countries. The health issue was considered a potential ‘deal-breaker’ for that 
round, what explains the openness of the participants for compromises. Second, the phar-
maceutical industry got under increasing public pressure to relativise its hard position. The 
more the right to health and the access to drugs in developing countries became a central 
political and moral issue, the more the industry was forced to react to the allegations of be-
ing only interested in profits and neglecting the devastating situation of patients in the Third 
World. In order to demonstrate corporate responsibility, the companies thus step by step 
made concessions on that issue. Its strong resource-based power did not help the pharma-
ceutical industry in that context – on the contrary: it was the crucial reason for the public 
and political pressure that finally led to the Doha Declaration. Third, CSO networks were 
highly efficient in four domains: creating media attention and public interest, mobilizing 
support both from the public and the private sector, lobbying representatives of Interna-
tional Organisations and governments of industrialised countries, and empowering South-
ern countries to take a strong position in the negations. They managed to establish a func-
tioning private governance scheme in which the relevant discourses were framed. Both 
through the strategic use of the media and through personal networking CSOs then 
achieved to disseminate information and transfer ideas to another governance scheme: the 
state-based WTO. 
The institutional setting thus enabled CSOs to exert considerable influence in one of the 
most important discourses in global health. Norm- and agenda-setting processes through 
private governance modes played a crucial role in this context. The discoursive power of the 
CSO networks combined with the decision-making power of the developing countries in a 
conventional forum of state regulation account for the relative strong position of both state 
and non-state actors from the South at the discoursive interfaces. This development was 
supported by the exercise of legal power by national governments in the conflict on parallel 
imports and compulsory licensing. 
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4.3. Legal Interfaces: Legal Disputes on Patents for Medicines 
Especially two developments in the legal realm helped to reach these compromises in terms 
of intellectual property rights in the health sector: the unsuccessful lawsuit of Pharmaceuti-
cal Manufacturers’ Association against the South African Government in 1999 and the con-
flict between the US and Brazil at the WTO in 2000/2001. In both cases state and non-state 
actors from the South together managed to defend their interests against the pharmaceutical 
industry. 
In the first case, the Pharmaceutical Manufacturers’ Association of South Africa, backed by 
39 pharmaceutical TNCs, filed a lawsuit against the South African Government which had 
authorized in 1997 the use of parallel imports to lower the costs of AIDS treatment (Medi-
cines and Related Substances Control Amendment Act). Before that there was a threat from 
the US-congress to cut off all ODA to South Africa. In April 2001, however, the lawsuit was 
finally dropped by the pharmaceuticals industry, as it proved to be a fiasco for their image. 
Transnational and South African CSOs in coalition with the South African government ran a 
campaign for cheap drugs and against the strict intellectual property rights regime which 
was the objective of TNCs and some Northern governments (cf. Marais 2005; von 
Soest/Weinel 2007). 
The second conflict arose in Brazil in 2000/2001. The Brazilian patent law authorized com-
pulsory licenses in the case of national health emergencies. This legal practice was in line 
with TRIPS and was mainly used as an instrument of pressure in the negotiations with 
pharmaceutical companies to reach better terms of licensing to Brazilian companies and to 
reduce the prices of drugs in Brazil. However, the US initiated a WTO panel dispute against 
another aspect of this patent law, the so-called local working requirement: If a foreign li-
cense-owner does not establish local production within three years, the government is au-
thorized to license local production. The US government withdrew the complaint in June 
2001 as Brazil indicated that it would only use the law in the case of pharmaceutical prod-
ucts (cf. Wade 2003: 5 et seq; Wogart/Calcagnotto 2006). This again can be interpreted as a 
reaction to the increasing public pressure to improve access to ARVs. 
This example shows that formal state institutions with legal instruments and juridical struc-
tures are important arenas of conflicts between Northern and Southern Actors. Legal institu-
tions can protect and further the interests of weak Southern actors. Generally, the course and 
the results of legal conflicts are an expression of general social, economical and political 
power relations so that powerful actors may have some advantages in some cases. However, 
as shown in these cases, the interactions in legal interfaces are influenced by discourses in 
which weak actors can deploy their specific power. 
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4.4. Resource-transfer Interfaces: Funding the Global Fight against HIV/AIDS 
Sufficient funding is – together with low drug prices and functioning health systems – a pre-
requisite for providing AIDS victims in developing countries with drugs. From 1996 to 2007 
the money spent for the global fight against HIV/AIDS increased from US$ 250 million to 
US$ 10 billion p.a. However, additional funding is necessary to meet the rising needs (of for 
example US$ 18 billion in 2007, estimated by UNAIDS). Bi- and multilateral donors cur-
rently account for approximately 61 % of all funding, while national financing (including 
both public spending by the national governments and out-of-the pocket payments of indi-
vidual patients) cover 33 % (cf. Kates/Lief 2006). Due to this structure Southern actors are 
relatively weak at the resource-transfer interfaces in global health, as they depend to a large 
degree on international transfers. As recipients of aid they are rather objects than subjects of 
the respective policy-making processes, although their policy options and channels of influ-
ence vary, depending on the strategies and politics of the donor organisations. 
Before the Global Fund was established in 2002, bilateral agencies and the World Bank were 
the most important donors in the field of global health. While it was clear from the begin-
ning that this new institution would act independently from the World Bank, its relationship 
to the UN system in general was contentious. Kofi Annan and many developing countries 
preferred a fund inside the UN system, but the G8 countries – most decisive the US and Ja-
pan – argued for an independent institution. The official rationale for its separate structure 
given by the donor countries was the lack of flexibility and efficiency of the UN system. 
However, it can be assumed that political interests in by-passing the UN played an impor-
tant role. The idea of installing a new institution outside the UN system – and thus more di-
rectly under control of the donor countries – seemed appealing to these actors as it could 
operate more according to their own interests and strategies (branded drugs, prevention 
methods). 
Thus, nation states (like in this case mainly the USA) use hybrid regulation and a network 
structure (the Global Fund) to circumvent international state-based organisations (WHO, 
UNAIDS) that are the formal and legitimised public health organisations responsible for 
dealing with HIV/AIDS. This means that hybrid regulation can be a result of nation state in-
terests and not only an approach of common problem-solving in fields of high interdepend-
ence, as often assumed. We observe here a typical example of forum shifting (for the concept 
see: Braithwaite/Drahos 2000)6 since the powerful actors (like in this case the USA and other 
G8 countries) shifted the issue of funding to that newly created hybrid organisation. 
                                                     
6  Braithwaite/Drahos (2000) distinguish four strategies of forum shifting: (1) moving a regulatory 
agenda from one organisation to another; (2) abandoning an organisation; (3) pursuing the same 
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Analysing the consequences of the establishment of the Global Fund for the entire global 
health governance structure, we can state a power shift. The donor countries created a new 
player in the field of global health that – albeit not aiming at being a political organisation – 
is provided with substantial power at the resource-transfer interfaces. This changed the 
structure of power relations in the field of global health 
However, meanwhile the Global Fund itself is sidestepped and has problems in attracting 
enough money. Although it is quite normal that donor countries disburse most of their 
money via bilateral programmes – as this guarantees them best to pursue their interests – it 
is striking that e.g. the US government established the President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS 
Relief (PEPFAR) after playing a crucial role in creating the Global Fund. PEPFAR was 
launched in 2004 providing 15 billion US$ until 2009 to fight HIV/AIDS (US$ 9 bn for new 
bilateral programmes in 14 African and Caribbean countries, 5 bn for existing programmes 
in 75 countries and 1 bn for the GF). PEPFAR is directed by the US Global AIDS Coordinator 
and implemented mainly by USAID, but with great involvement of certain US-based CSOs 
and some mainly faith-based CSOs from the recipient countries. We can assume that the 
policies of PEPFAR, which do not see condoms as normal method of HIV/AIDS prevention 
and which mainly utilises branded drugs, are influenced by interests from US American ac-
tors such as conservative and religious groups and pharmaceutical companies (cf. Burkhal-
ter 2004; Kohlmorgen 2007). 
PEPFAR thus can be interpreted as a reaction of the US government to developments in the 
Global Fund which did not converge with their original interest. While it was assumed in 
the beginning that the GF would mainly finance branded drugs (and thus secure markets for 
the large pharmaceutical companies) and that the influence of donor countries over national 
policies would be relatively strong, the GF under the explicit leadership of its then Executive 
Director Richard Feachem managed to develop its own policies, based on the principles of 
national ownership, partnership and performance-based funding. It leaves politically deli-
cate questions like the use of condoms or the issue of generic drugs to the countries them-
selves and does not interfere much from the global level with the respective policies. The 
pharmaceutical industry is only represented at the Executive Board as member of the pri-
vate sector delegation, but did not manage to obtain a Board seat; and also its desire to con-
tribute to the GF via the provision of (branded) drugs was rejected various times. Further-
more, the Global Fund with its hybrid regulation and its bottom-up approach furthers par-
ticipation of different types of stakeholders and thus implicates a sharing of power with 
other actors (among them CSOs and governments of developing countries). These develop-
                                                                                                                                                                     
agenda in more than one organisation and (4) preventing an international organisation from acting 
as a forum for regulatory development in the first place. 
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ments made it obviously less attractive for some Northern governments to support the 
Global Fund and contributed to the establishment of competing initiatives like PEPFAR 
which follow a stronger top-down approach, which limits the influence of actors from de-
veloping countries significantly. 
These processes of forum shifting at the resource-transfer interfaces have an impact on the 
role of Southern actors in global health. While the Global Fund on the one hand can be in-
terpreted as being directed against the established UN Organisations in health and to a cer-
tain degree contributed to a weakening of WHO and UNAIDS – organisations where South-
ern governments are relatively powerful due to the voting structures –, it contributed on the 
other hand to a stronger integration and participation of non-state actors, advocating for 
Southern interests, in processes of global health governance. With the Country Coordinating 
Mechanisms (CCMs) it pursues a bottom-up approach that gives the ownership on the 
funded projects to the recipient countries. When it became clear that the GF was acting rela-
tively independent from its donors and that it developed in a different way then originally 
assumed, substantial resources were channelled through PEPFAR, where the US govern-
ment was able to shape processes more directly than in the GF. It is also interesting to see 
how the US strategies where influenced through the respective institutional setting: Whilst 
the US delegation to the Fund tolerates – in spite of all criticism of conservative groups and 
politicians in the US – the use of generics and condoms in the fight against HIV/AIDS, 
PEPFAR – as outlined – mainly gives money for patented drugs and propagates prevention 
methods like being abstinent instead of using condoms. The institutional context thus has an 
important effect on the behaviour and strategies of actors, as hybrid forms of regulation – 
such as networks and partnerships – tend to include a stronger necessity to enter compro-
mises and modify strategies than purely state-based forms of governance, where actors are 
able to act more autonomously. 
 
 
5. Conclusion 
The constellation of actors in the fight against HIV/AIDS – as in the field of global health 
governance in general – is very heterogeneous, with actors differing not only with regard to 
their character (public, non-public), their institutional structure (formalized, informal) or 
their level of activity (global, national, local), but also with regard to their interests, their 
logic of action and their power resources. By analysing the institutional structure and its im-
plications for discourses and decision-making processes in global health governance we 
have shown that Southern actors (governments and CSOs) are able to influence the course of 
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political activities at the global level considerably – mainly through discoursive and also or-
ganizational interfaces. However, the fact that donor countries have much resource-based 
power and pursue their interests, represent severe constraints. 
Northern and Southern CSOs together with few governments from developing countries – 
both types of actors with mainly human rights interests in this case – opened up and entered 
the field of access to medicines in HIV/AIDS policies. Governments from the North and ac-
cordingly most of the International Organisations that are shaped by them reacted hesitantly 
to the increasing HIV/AIDS epidemic in developing countries and in particular in Sub-
Saharan Africa. There was a window of opportunity for the self-empowerment of weak ac-
tors due to the lack of coherent regulation at the global level and the low-level activities of 
more powerful actors. Consequently this field of global governance was to some extent al-
ready ‘occupied’ by normally weak actors when the more powerful Northern governments 
entered. As effective global health governance relies on the involvement of Northern gov-
ernments and their resources, CSOs and Southern governments appealed to them to inten-
sify their engagement and created some pressure on them. Additionally the undissolved 
question of patent laws and intellectual property rights in the process of globalisation 
caused more interventions of Northern governments in the field of global health. Further-
more, the growing awareness of the infectious disease threat and of the vicious circle of 
poverty and diseases and its implications for security matters have led to increasing inter-
ests of Northern governments in global health affairs. Thus, self-interests of industrialised 
countries can be seen as important catalysts of global health governance and of the fight 
against HIV/AIDS. However, governments and also pharmaceutical companies of industri-
alised countries were forced to political and institutional compromises, as weaker actors had 
developed some strengths and some discoursive power already. 
The main characteristics of the current architecture of global health governance – or in other 
words: the institutional expression of the compromises between the actors – are the rela-
tively great importance of non-state actors and forms of hybrid regulation (such as PPPs) 
and the dominant role of governments of donor countries. This leads to a multiplicity of ac-
tors and institutional fragmentation. This structure of global health governance seems to be 
inconsistent and contradictory as hybrid regulation and the involvement of civil society or-
ganisations can put powerful nation states under pressure and cause them to make com-
promises at least in some cases and consequently can weaken them to some extent. 
,Governments, however, can use networks and hybrid regulation and even CSOs as fora to 
achieve their goals – e.g. to weaken International Organisations like WHO or to circumvent 
disliked governments in the South. Thus, the strong role of Northern governments and the 
increasing relevance of hybrid, private and civil society regulation are intertwined. 
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The analysis of the field of global health has shown that the role of Southern actors in global 
governance processes is mixed, as politics at the interfaces are influenced both by the con-
stellation of actors defined by their interests and power resources and by the different 
modes of governance involved. Our analysis thus leads us to the following conclusions: 
 The more the type of power an actors disposes of corresponds with the type of inter-
face, the more influence that actor is able to exert. 
 The greater the heterogeneity of interests the more conflictive the political processes 
at the interfaces. 
 The mode of governance and the corresponding logic restricts the autonomy of the ac-
tors and structures the interactions at the interfaces. 
 Powerful actors tend to choose that mode of governance that seems to be most ade-
quate for reaching their objectives. The current multifaceted structure of global gov-
ernance provides many different opportunities for strategies of forum shifting. At the 
same time, these strategies have a considerable impact on this differentiation of 
global governance, as they further the creation of new institutions. 
 
Especially in ‘soft’ policy fields actors like CSOs and governments of the South, which are 
normally perceived as weak, have the chance to influence strategies and policies due to their 
specific power resources and the institutional setting of global governance. This is especially 
the case when other actors basically ignore – at least for a certain time – a policy field or 
when interests overlap or converge to a certain degree. Forms of hybrid, private and civil 
society regulation offer opportunities and chances for an increased participation and weight 
of Southern actors. At the same time, however, they can contribute to a fragmentation of ac-
tivities and an ineffectiveness of global governance, and they can also be used by powerful 
actors to bypass certain institutions and actors that do not function according to their inter-
ests and/or are contested in terms of conflict with other actors. 
The different types of interfaces in global governance have a double function in that context. 
On the one hand they serve as points of mediation between the particular interests of actors 
(e.g. pooling of funds and knowledge at the resource-transfer interfaces; coordinated activi-
ties through organizational interfaces), and thus allow a better integration of Southern per-
spectives in global processes. On the other hand they are also arenas of global conflicts (e.g. 
conflicts between market- and welfare-oriented interests at the legal interfaces; conflicts on 
different normative worldviews at the discoursive interfaces), where different norms and in-
terests collide. They thus not only shape specific interactions processes in global governance, 
but also influence the relationship between economy, state and civil society in the broader 
context of North-South relations. 
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